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ABSTRACT 
ANALYSIS OF RXBOT 
by Esha Patil 
In recent years, botnets have emerged as a serious threat on the Internet. Botnets are 
commonly used for exploits such as distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, identity 
theft, spam, and click fraud. The immense size of botnets (hundreds or thousands of PCs 
connected in a botnet) increases the ubiquity and speed of attacks. Due to the criminally 
motivated uses of botnets, they pose a serious threat to the community. Thus, it is 
important to analyze known botnets to understand their working. 
Most of the botnets target security vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows platform. 
Rxbot is a Win32 bot that belongs to the Agobot family. This paper presents an analysis 
of Rxbot. The observations of the analysis process provide in-depth understanding of 
various aspects of the botnet lifecycle such as botnet architecture, network formation, 
propagation mechanisms, and exploit capabilities. The study of Rxbot reveals certain 
tricks and techniques used by the botnet owners to hide their bots and bypass some 
security software. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter introduces malware and emphasizes the changing trend in malware usage. 
The purpose is to help the readers understand the importance of malware analysis. 
1.1 What is Malware? 
Malware is a term derived from the words "malicious" and "software." Malware is 
software designed to damage a computer system without the owner's consent 
("Malware," 2009). Malware includes harmful software like spyware, adware, trojan 
horses, worms, and viruses. 
1.2 The changing trend in Malware usage 
The purpose of malware has evolved a great deal during the past several years. During 
the early years, malware was written as experiments or pranks intended to cause mere 
annoyance rather than serious harm ("Malware," 2009). In recent years, the motivation 
for writing malware has shifted from mere experiments to profit-based malware creation. 
With the increasing use of the Internet, malware is being used for spam, identity theft, 
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, and monetary purposes ("Botnet," 2009). 
1.3 Malware infection increases the threat 
Various types of malware include manual or automatic spreading mechanisms. Worms 
can spread an infection automatically over the network. Viruses can spread the infection 
with user intervention. Attackers employ smart techniques like personalized email 
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messages, free software, and games to persuade users for getting their computer systems 
infected. The spread of malware increases the threat by broadening the infection area 
("Malware," 2009). 
1.4 Hiding makes detection difficult 
Trojans have the intelligence of pretending to be innocent. The prime motive of 
concealment is to infect the victim systems without the owner's knowledge and consent 
("Malware," 2009). 
1.5 Evolution of Malware 
Before the popularity of the Internet, early virus infections were observed in programs on 
personal computers or executable boot sectors of floppy disks. The targeted systems 
ranged from Apple II and Macintosh to IBM PC and MS-DOS systems. These virus 
infections required user exchange of software or boot floppies ("Malware," 2009). 
In 1988, network-borne infectious programs, called worms, were first developed. Worms 
originated on multitasking Unix systems. The worms were different from viruses in 
exploiting the security vulnerabilities in network server programs. Rather than spreading 
infection into executable programs, worms had the capability of running as a separate 
process ("Malware," 2009). 
In the 1990s, it became possible to write macro viruses that infected Microsoft Word 
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documents and templates rather than applications. These viruses exploited the fact that 
macros in a Word document are executable ("Malware," 2009). 
Today, worms have extended the damage to home users and businesses via the Internet. 
Worms today still behave like the worms in 1988. Worms are commonly targeting large 
number of Windows systems ("Malware," 2009). 
1.5.1 Elk Cloner virus 
During the early years, passive propagation of viruses through the exchange of floppy 
disks was prevalent. A virus was found in 1982 on Apple II and was known as Elk 
Cloner ("Elk Cloner," 2009). 
1.5.2 Melissa computer worm 
With the first worms, propagation was extended to a worldwide scale. The Melissa worm 
was first found on March 26, 1999, when Internet mail systems were shut down as a 
result of getting clogged by emails infected by Melissa. Melissa is a mass-mailing macro 
virus that can spread on word processors like Microsoft Word 97, and Word 2000 as well 
as Microsoft Excel 97, 2000, and 2003. The way Melissa spreads is through execution of 
a macro from a downloaded Word document and attempts to mass email itself. The 
victims of mass emailing are the first 50 entries of the address book or alias list 
("Melissa," 2009). 
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1.5.3 Storm botnet 
With the increasing use of the Internet, the focus of malware shifted to ubiquity and 
speed, and the motivation of attacks was money. First found in January 2007, the Storm 
worm accounted for 8% of all malware on Microsoft Windows computers ("Storm 
botnet," 2009). Storm is a trojan horse that spreads through spam email. The Storm 
botnet is a network of zombie computers connected by the Storm worm and can be 
controlled remotely. It was estimated, by September 2007, that the Storm botnet was 
running on anywhere from 1 million to 50 million computer systems. This botnet is used 
for various criminal activities. The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation has 
considered the botnet as a major risk to increased bank fraud, identity theft, and other 
cybercrimes ("Storm botnet," 2009). 
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Chapter 2: Introduction to Botnets 
This chapter presents a brief overview of the botnet lifecycle and usage. The purpose is 
to establish a clear understanding of the mechanics of botnets, before moving to the 
detailed analysis of Rxbot. 
2.1 Overview of Botnets 
Botnets are one of the most dangerous and fast changing threats on the Internet today. 
Traditional botnets are networks of compromised computers that can be controlled 
remotely using Command and Control (C&C) mechanisms. Pieces of malicious code 
called "bots" are installed on the victim machines. The originator of the botnet is known 
as the "bot herder" or the "bot master." The bot herder controls and commands the bots 
remotely, using various C&C mechanisms ("Botnet," 2009). Usually IRC is used for 
C&C. However, recently there is a shift towards using peer-to-peer mechanism for C&C. 
A bot is also referred to as "zombie" or "drone." Bots run automatically and are hidden. 
Bots propagate themselves automatically to other victim machines. An attacker can 
remotely control a large number (hundreds or thousands) of machines connected in a 
botnet ("Botnet," 2009). 
Bots are not inherently evil. The first bots were programs used in Internet Relay Chat 
(IRC) networks to provide gaming or messaging services ("Internet Relay Chat bot," 
2009). These were "good" bots that enabled real-time communication through IRC 
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channels. Eventually bot code turned into malicious software serving nefarious purposes. 
Botnets can be used for various monetary and destructive purposes including distributed 
denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, spam, click fraud, identity theft, and so on ("Botnet," 
2009). 
2.2 Botnet Architecture 
2.2.1 Formation 
A malicious piece of code called the "bot client" is created by an attacker who acts as the 
bot herder or the bot master. The bot herder infects a victim computer over the Internet 
with this malicious bot code without the knowledge or consent of the computer owner. 
Once the computer is compromised, the bot can take over the computer, and the bot 
typically remains hidden. The bot is programmed to accept and respond to commands 
and communicate with the Command and Control (C&C) center established by the bot 
master. Usually an ERC server is setup as the C&C center. When the bot successfully 
infects a victim machine, it informs the C&C center. The bot client is then updated with 
new commands. The bot client goes over the Internet attempting to propagate itself to 
other victim machines. In this manner, a large number of machines are compromised and 
connected to the botnet that can be controlled and instructed remotely by an attacker to 
perform various types of for-profit and destructive activities (Nachreiner, 2009). 
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2.2.2 Command and Control (C&C) 
A bot master establishes a Command and Control (C&C) center to control and command 
the network of bots. Typically, an IRC server is setup and configured to act as the C&C 
center. Public IRC servers can be used for C&C purposes. However, today most bot 
herders prefer to hide by setting up private IRC servers for their C&C mechanism. A bot 
master can install the IRC server on any compromised machine. Using IRC channels, a 
bot master can remotely command and control his army of bots (Nachreiner, 2009). 
2.2.3 Harvesting bot army 
Getting the first bot is the toughest job for a bot master. In order to install a bot client on 
a victim machine, an attacker can use various hacking techniques such as spam email 
with attachment, music download, exploiting unpatched vulnerabilities, hosting on a 
website that pushes it to visitors. The bots are programmed with scanning commands 
which can be used to spread the infection to many other victim machines over the 
Internet. Once the first bot is propagated to a victim machine, the scanner commands of 
the bot can add other machines to the malicious network. These compromised machines 
then go on and add many other machines to the network. In this manner, a huge number 
of machines can be forced to join the botnet. The bot masters can stop compromising 
machines anytime they think they have a sufficient bot army (Nachreiner, 2009). 
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Chapter 3: IRC 
This chapter introduces the IRC mechanism typically used by botnets for Command and 
Control. The operational knowledge of IRC will support a thorough understanding of the 
analysis results presented in this paper. 
3.1 Introduction to Internet Relay Chat (IRC) 
IRC is a form of real-time Internet chat or synchronous conferencing. IRC was created in 
1988. It is a teleconferencing system that uses the client-server model and runs in a 
distributed manner ("Internet Relay Chat," 2009). The IRC client-to-server protocol is 
documented in RFC 1459 (Oikarinen, 1993). IRC enables one-to-one as well as group 
communication through messaging. For group communication, IRC channels are 
established ("Internet Relay Chat," 2009). 
3.2 IRC features 
3.2.1 IRC Server 
An IRC server is the central point of contact for various clients to communicate with each 
other. IRC servers can connect to each other, thus forming an IRC network ("Internet 
Relay Chat," 2009). 
3.2.2 IRC Client 
IRC servers can be accessed by users via an IRC client. IRC clients are distinguished 
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using a unique nickname that can contain a maximum of 9 characters ("Internet Relay 
Chat," 2009). A popular Windows IRC client is the "mIRC." 
3.2.3 Commands and Responses 
IRC clients can send single-line messages to an IRC server and receive responses from 
the server for those messages. Commands can be entered using the IRC clients by 
prefixing each command with a "/". Each message can contain three parts: an optional 
prefix, the command, and the parameters for the command. The parts of a message are 
separated by an ascii space character (0x20) ("Internet Relay Chat," 2009). 
3.2.4 Channels 
Channels are the communication medium in an IRC session. Different users who want to 
communicate with each other can join the same IRC channel using the command "/join 
#channelname". Once a user joins an IRC channel, the user can send a message on the 
channel, which will be communicated to other users of the same channel. IRC channels 
can be protected using passwords. Users are required to enter a password in order to join 
a password-protected IRC channel ("Internet Relay Chat," 2009). 
3.2.5 Modes 
There are two types of modes: user mode and channel mode. The modes can be set or 
unset using a mode command. A mode is represented by a single case-sensitive letter. 
For example, the letter "i" represents invisible user mode, or the letter "p" represents a 
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private channel mode ("Internet Relay Chat," 2009). 
3.2.6 Operators 
"IRC Operators," also known as "IRCops," are users who have superior rights over the 
entire IRC network or their local IRC server. These rights allow a user to perform 
network administration. An IRC operator can act as the channel operator. Usually, 
channel administration and network administration are handled separately ("Internet 
Relay Chat," 2009). 
3.3 IRC Bots 
An "IRC bot" is an automated client that connects to IRC. The difference between a 
normal IRC user and an IRC bot is that the IRC bot carries out functions in an automated 
fashion. The early IRC bots were used in games. The usage evolved to serve special 
purposes like managing channels for user groups, maintaining access lists, and providing 
access to databases. Bots can perform many other useful functions, such as logging 
activities in IRC channel, hosting games, creating statistics, etc. ("Internet Relay Chat 
bot," 2009). 
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Chapter 4: Malware Analysis 
The process of analyzing a piece of malware is explained in this chapter. 
4.1 Malware Overview 
As previously mentioned, the term Malware is derived from two words: Malicious and 
Software ("Malware," 2009). Malware is an intelligent piece of code that exhibits the 
following behavior: 
• It will infect its targets. 
• It will propagate itself, automatically or with human intervention. 
• It might install a resident program, which allows an attacker to access and master 
the infected system. 
• It will remain hidden so as to prevent detection by the user of the system. 
4.2 Malware Typology 
Malware occurs in different forms such as viruses, worms, trojan horses, rootkits, 
backdoors, spyware, and adware. These forms differ in the type of activities they 
perform. Various activities performed by any form of malware are shown in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: Malware activities diagram 
4.3 Malware Analysis Process: 
The malware analysis process includes the following three steps: 
1. Build or adapt the analysis infrastructure 
The first step of the analysis process of any malware includes setting up the required 
infrastructure. Building the analysis infrastructure includes setting up computers with 
specific target operating systems that are exploited for vulnerabilities, installing 
various analyzers, setting up particular servers that are attacked, etc. (Buchs, 2007). 
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2. Static analysis 
This step must be performed before executing the malware and infecting the target 
machines for study. This type of analysis includes observations such as 
characteristics of files, source code analysis, configuration study, etc. (Buchs, 2007). 
3. Dynamic or "live" analysis 
At this step, the analyst will record the behavioral characteristics of the malware such 
as accesses to files, directories, disks, windows registry, automatic startup 
mechanisms, and integrity checks of files (Buchs, 2007). 
Dynamic analysis can be performed in following ways: 
a. Malware process analysis 
b. Network traffic analysis 
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Chapter 5: Analysis of Rxbot 
This chapter presents the detailed analysis of "Rxbot." 
5.1 Overview of Rxbot 
5.1.1 Definition 
"Rxbot" (also known as "rBot") is a Win32 computer IRC worm (written in C++) that 
spreads to computers running Windows XP ("Agobot," 2009). 
5.1.2 Features of Rxbot 
Rxbot has the following features ("Agobot," 2009): 
• Belongs to the Agobot family of worms 
• Maintains modularity 
• Targets the Microsoft Windows platform 
• Uses IRC for Command and Control (C&C) 
• Supports password protected IRC channels for bot communication 
• Includes the following capabilities 
o Port scanning 
o Packet sniffing 
o Key logging 
• Includes Multi-threaded, Object Oriented, and Polymorphic code 
• Uses SMTP client for sending spam and spreading copies of itself 
• Uses HTTP client for click fraud and DDoS attacks 
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5.1.3 Exploits 
Attackers exploit Rxbot to perform the following harmful activities ("Botnet," 2009; 
"Agotbot," 2009): 
• Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks 
• Identity Theft 
• Spam 
• Click Fraud 
5.2 Analysis Infrastructure 
The analysis of Rxbot was performed using the following infrastructure: 
• PC #1 running Windows operating system used as the victim machine 
o Rxbot infection was spread to this machine. 
• PC #2 running Windows operating system used as the IRC Command and Control 
(C&C) center 
o UnreallRCd was installed on this machine as a daemon process for the 
IRC server, 
o mIRC was installed on this machine as a Windows client for accessing the 
IRC server. 
• Private network established between PC #1 and PC #2 
o Cross-cable connection was used between the two PCs. 
The analysis was performed very carefully in a private network. The personal computers 
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used for analysis were disconnected from the Internet in order to make sure that the 
Internet was not endangered due to the experiments performed on Rxbot. 
5.2.1 UnreallRCd 
"UnreallRCd" is a very popular open source IRC daemon among the botnet community. 
It runs on Windows and Linux operating systems. It is a light weight and easy to 
configure daemon ("UnreallRCd," 2009). 
5.2.2 mIRC 
"mIRC" is a popular Windows IRC client. It is available for free, and it is relatively easy 
to setup. mIRC provides a user friendly GUI to perform various IRC related operations 
("mIRC," 2009). 
5.3 Static code analysis of Rxbot 
5.3.1 What is static code analysis? 
Static code analysis is the analysis performed on computer software without executing 
the programs built from that software. This type of analysis can be performed on source 
code or object code. This can be performed in an automated fashion using various 
available source code analysis tools or with human analysis of the code known as 
program understanding ("Static code analysis," 2009). 
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5.3.2 Source code analysis of Rxbot 
The source code of Rxbot was obtained from an underground forum ("Rxbot source 
code," 2009) as a "rar" file. After extraction, the C++ source code was retrieved. The 
source code of Rxbot included a collection of C++ source and header files. Human 
analysis was performed on the Rxbot source code, relying on knowledge of the C++ 
programming language and the Windows Operating System. 
5.3.3 Modularity of Rxbot source code 
The source code of Rxbot is very modular. Each individual feature of Rxbot has a 
separate C++ source file. This enables the bot master to manage the botnet source code 
easily. Adding a new module or removing any unwanted feature is simple. One can use 
the original source code base and add new modules to it. Members of the Agobot family 
are usually compatible with each other. A module written for one member can be easily 
ported to another member. Modularity of Rxbot facilitates this mix-matching of modules 
to meet the bot herder's requirements. 
5.3.4 Configuration of Rxbot 
The configuration file for Rxbot is named as "configs.h", and it is located under the 
header folder. The configuration properties of Rxbot are organized below with brief 
description: 
• Primary IRC server properties 
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These properties are used to configure the IRC Command and Control server for the 
botnet. These should match the settings of the IRC server instance used for 
Command and Control. The IRC server configuration details are described in Table 
5.1. 
Table 5.1: IRC server configuration details 
Property 
IRC Server Name or IP 
IRC Server Password 
IRC Server Port 
IRC Channel Name 
IRC Channel Password 
Variable 
char serverf] = " " 
char serverpassf] = "" 
int port = 6667 
char channel[] = "#pwn" 
char chanpassf] = "" 
Description 
This is the IP or hostname 
of the IRC server acting as 
C&C center. 
This is the password 
required to connect to the 
IRC server. 
This is the listening port of 
the IRC server. The default 
port is 6667. 
This is the name of the IRC 
channel the bot is supposed 
to join. 
IRC channels are protected 
using passwords. This 
18 
property contains the 
password required to join 
the IRC channel. 
• Backup IRC server properties 
There is an option of defining a secondary IRC server. This server acts as a backup for 
the main IRC server if it goes offline. The properties for the backup IRC server are listed 
in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2: Backup IRC server configuration details 
Property 
IRC Server2 Name or IP 
IRC Server2 Port 
IRC Channel2 Name 
IRC Channel2 Password 
Variable 
char server2[] = "" 
int port2 = 6668 
char channel2[] = "#pwn " 
char chanpass2[] = "" 
Description 
This is the IP or hostname 
of the backup IRC server. 
This is the listening port of 
the backup IRC server. 
This is the channel name for 
backup IRC server. 
This is the password 
required to connect to the 
IRC channel of the backup 
IRC server. 
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• Other IRC properties 
These include other properties required by IRC such as the command properties and user 
properties. These properties will define the rules that must be followed by the IRC 
commands and users, in order to carry out the communication in the IRC channel. The 
configuration details specific to IRC users and commands are explained in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3: IRC user and command configuration details 
Property 
Channel Topic Command 
Command Prefix 
Nick Type 
Random Numbers in Nick 
Nick Prefix 
Variable 
BOOL topiccmd = TRUE 
Char prefix = '.' 
int nicktype = CONSTNICK 
int maxrand = 7 
BOOL nickprefix = TRUE 
Description 
If set to "TRUE", an IRC 
command can be used as 
the channel topic. 
This is the prefix character 
for the IRC commands. 
The nick type is identified 
by this property. It can take 
the values declared in the 
file rndnick.h. 
This property indicates how 
many random numbers are 
allowed in the bot's 
nickname. 
This is a flag indicating the 
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Nick Constant 
Bot Mode 
char nickconst[] = 
"[skank]" 
char modeonconn[] = "-x" 
presence of nick prefix. 
This string is the first part 
of the bot's nickname. 
The bot's mode after 
connection is identified by 
this property. 
• Bot client properties 
The bot client properties define the characteristics of the bot client file such as ID, 
version, etc. These properties are described in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4: Bot client configuration details 
Property 
Bot ID 
Bot Version 
Bot Password 
Bot Executable Filename 
Variable 
char botid[] = "" 
char versionf] = " 
char passwordf] = "" 
char filename [] = " " 
Description 
This string defines the bot 
ID. 
The bot version is defined 
by this string. 
This is the password to 
connect to the botnet. 
This is the filename of the 
bot executable created by 
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the Trojan installed on the 
victim machine. 
• Bot feature properties 
These properties define the configuration for the various features of the Rxbot such as 
debug logging, key logging, etc. They also define the registry entries. Table 5.5 explains 
these properties in detail. 
Table 5.5: Bot feature configuration details 
Property 
Debug Log Filename 
Key Logger Filename 
Auto Start Flag 
Variable 
Mfdef DEBUG _LOGGING 
char logfile[]= "c:\debug.crf"; 
#endif 
char keylogfile[] = "test, erf" 
BOOL AutoStart = TRUE 
Description 
This is the name of the 
debug log file created 
by the bot process on 
the victim machine. 
The keylogging feature 
of Rxbot will log the 
victim's keystrokes to 
the file identified by the 
value of this property. 
This flag must be set to 
"TRUE" to enable the 
auto start registry keys. 
22 
Auto Start Value 
Pay Load Filename 
Exploit Channel Name 
Key Logger Channel 
Name 
Packet Sniffer 
Filename 
char valuename[] = "Microsoft IT 
Update" 
char 
szLocalPayloadFile[]="payload.dat" 
char exploitchanf] = "#pwn" 
char keylogchan[] = "#pwn" 
char psniffchanf] = "#pwn" 
This is the registry key 
value for the auto start 
feature of the bot. 
This is the filename for 
the pay load. 
This is the redirection 
channel for the exploit 
messages. 
This is the redirection 
channel for the 
messages from the key 
logging function. 
This is the redirection 
channel for the packet 
sniffing messages. 
• Ports for other services 
The configuration properties for additional services are explained in Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6: Service ports configuration details 
Property 
sock4 Daemon Port 
Variable 
int socks4port - 1243 
Description 
The port for sock4 daemon 
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tftp Port 
http port 
rlogin port 
int tftpport = 69 
int httpport = 2001 
int rloginport = 513 
is defined here. 
The port for tftp daemon is 
defined here. 
The port for http daemon is 
defined here. 
The port for rlogin daemon 
is defined here. 
5.3.5 Different modules of Rxbot 
The analysis of some of the modules of Rxbot is presented below: 
• rBotxpp 
This is the most important module of the Rxbot source code. It contains the core code of 
Rxbot. This is the bot's main "brain" from which the execution of different bot exploits 
starts. 
• autostartcpp 
This source code file provides the auto start functionality for a bot. It enables the bot to 
add itself to the victim machine's registry so that it can start automatically. For this 
feature to be enabled, the Boolean variable "AutoStart" in configs.h should be set to 
"true." The value of registry entry will be picked up from the character variable 
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"valuename[]" in configs.h. Please refer to Table 5.5 for details of the above two 
configuration properties. 
• capturccpp 
This module adds the functionality of capturing screen shots, images through webcam or 
even videos playing on the victim machines. This would enable retrieving confidential 
data of the victim machine's owner for identity theft or any other harmful purposes like 
morphing the images for creating porn. 
• cdkeys.cpp 
This module of the Rxbot provides the functionality of stealing CD keys of different 
licensed software from the Windows registry of victim machines. This C++ file contains 
definitions for different registry entry locations for various software. This instructs the 
bot where to look for CD keys. If the registry entry locations for any popular licensed 
software are known, a bot master can add these registry entries to this source file and 
retrieve CD keys for that particular software. 
• flndpass.cpp 
This module pulls the victim machine's users' passwords from memory and sends them 
to the bot master over the IRC channel. The passwords can then be used to hack the 
users' email accounts or bank accounts. 
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• processes.cpp 
The functionality of this module is to kill any process on the victim machines. For 
example, one might want to kill anti-virus software running on a victim machine. A bot 
master creates a list of processes to kill on the victim machines. Most of the processes 
would include anti-virus, firewall, and security processes that are running on the victim 
machines and can hinder to the bot functioning. This function also kills any other worms 
running on the victim machines to reduce competition with other exploits. 
Additional modules can be added to the Rxbot as required by the bot herder. Modules 
can simply be plugged into Rxbot from different Agobot variants. Unwanted modules 
can be removed from the source code. 
5.4 Dynamic analysis of Rxbot 
Dynamic analysis of Rxbot was performed by executing the bot in the controlled 
environment described in section 5.2. 
5.4.1 What is dynamic analysis? 
Dynamic analysis is the analysis of computer software performed by executing it on a 
real or virtual processor ("Dynamic program analysis," 2009). 
5.4.2 Building and executing the bot client 
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Dynamic analysis requires a Trojan that would install the bot client on the victim 
machine. To build the Trojan, the Rxbot source code was obtained from underground 
forums and was compiled using Visual Studio 6. The build process produced rBot.exe 
which was used as the Trojan to infect the victim machine. 
The rBot executable was transported manually to a personal computer running Windows 
XP and was executed on the machine. In the real world scenario, the bot master will 
spread the bot executable on target machines as email attachments, through music 
downloads, or using various other means for installation of the malicious executable. 
5.4.3 Process level analysis 
• New bot process 
Upon execution of the Trojan rBot.exe, a new bot executable file is created with the name 
specified in the configuration file as property "char filename[]". This executable is 
located under "C:\Windows\System32" as a hidden file. A new bot client process is 
started on the victim machine. Figure 5.1 shows the process level details of the bot 
program. 
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Figure 5.1: Rxbot process level details 
• Auto start 
If the Boolean variable "AutoStart" in the configuration file is set to "true," a registry 
entry for auto starting the bot process is created in the Windows registry with the value 
specified in the configuration property "char valuename[]". The following registry keys 
are observed: 
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Figure 5.2: Windows registry key under "Run" for Rxbot process 
2. HKEY LOCAL MACHINESOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ 
RunServices 
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Figure 5.3: Windows registry key under "RunServices" for Rxbot process 
5.4.4 Network level analysis 
Even though the bot has infected the victim machine, it can neither inform the bot herder 
nor accept commands from the bot herder. For this communication between the bot 
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clients and the bot master, the master has to establish a Command and Control (C&C) 
server. The master controls his army of bots using this Command and Control center. 
• Establishing IRC Command and Control center 
Since Rxbot follows the IRC protocol, an IRC server is required for Command and 
Control. Publicly available IRC servers can be used for this purpose. Some bot masters 
also prefer to setup their own private IRC servers to better hide their bot. It is very 
important for a bot master to hide his Command and Control center since it serves as the 
heart of the botnet. If the Command and Control center for a botnet is detected, it is easy 
to bring down the whole botnet (which might comprise hundreds or thousands of PCs) by 
shutting down the Command and Control server. A bot master can even install the IRC 
server for C&C on a remote, victim machine. 
PC #2 with UnreallRCd (described in section 5.2) was used as the IRC C&C server for 
the experimental analysis of Rxbot. The UnreallRCd instance was configured with the 
settings exactly matching the IRC configuration properties (described in Table 5.1) of the 
Rxbot client. UnreallRCd instance was running on PC #2 and listening on port 6667. 
• Creating IRC Channel and Gaining Operator Rights 
The IRC client program mIRC (described in section 5.2.2) was used to connect to the 
IRC C&C server. It is required that a user creates a nickname before connecting to the 
C&C server. A user with nickname "CS299BotMaster" logged into the IRC server 
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instance using mIRC. After a successful connection was established with the IRC server 
instance, user "CS299BotMaster" created and joined an IRC channel with the channel 
name "#CS299IRCchannel" that was configured in the bot client. Since user 
"CS299BotMaster" was the first user to join channel "#CS299IRCchannel", the user 
obtained operator privileges over the channel. A symbol "@" was observed preceding 
the user's nickname in the mIRC console. The IRC channel operator is indentified by the 
"@" symbol preceding the nickname. The channel operator has administrative rights 
over the channel. 
• Recruiting bots 
The first bot of this IRC botnet was PC #1 (described in section 5.2). It was infected with 
rBot.exe. This bot was configured to connect to the UnreallRCd server instance running 
on PC #2 and join channel "#CS299IRCchannel" created by the bot master 
"CS299BotMaster." The mIRC console and the debug logs written on the victim 
machine (PC #1) displayed messages indicating that a new nick joined the IRC channel 
#CS299rRCchannel". In a similar manner, a number of other machines can be infected 
with the rBot.exe and added to the botnet. The victim PC can also scan other PCs for 
vulnerabilities and spread the Rxbot infection. 
• Controlling the botnet 
The bot master can control the bots using the following features of Rxbot: 
o Password-protected channels 
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The IRC channels are secured using passwords. This prevents the bot rivals 
from gaining control of the botnet channel. 
o Prefixed IRC commands 
The bots are configured to accept commands prefixed with a specific letter. 
This assures that the bots will not accept commands from rival bot masters. 
o Moderated mode 
A bot master can protect a channel by operating it in a moderated mode. This 
ensures that only the bot master can talk on the channel. 
5.5 Tricks used by bot masters 
The analysis reveals the following tricks used by bot masters: 
• The default value for IRC server port is 6667. However, bot masters prefer to use 
a different port to make it difficult to detect the IRC C&C center. 
• The bot masters can assign a tricky filename to the bot executable that is created 
on the victim machine after the Trojan is installed. This file can be named to 
indicate it is an anti-virus scanner or some type of security software. This would 
prevent the victim machine's owner from noticing the installed bot executable file 
or the bot process that is running. 
• The bot master can trick the victim by using unusual file extensions like "jpeg", 
"erf, etc., for the debug log files and the key logger files. 
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Chapter 6: Packing and Crypting 
This chapter explains two processes: packing and crypting that can be performed on bot 
client executables to protect the malicious bots from being detected by anti-virus 
software. 
6.1 Introduction to packing and crypting 
These are optional processes an attacker can perform on bot executable files to facilitate 
easy spreading of the bots and bypass some security software. Packing reduces the bot 
client file size. Smaller files spread over the Internet quickly, and signature scanning 
becomes difficult. Crypting encrypts the bot client so that anti-virus scanners and other 
security software cannot detect the bot (Nachreiner, 2009). 
6.2 Packing and Crypting performed on rBotexe 
6.2.1 Packing rBot.exe 
The rBot.exe obtained by compiling the RxBot source code, was passed through packer 
software called "PEPACK" ("PEPACK," 2009). Figure 6.1 illustrates the packing 
process performed on rBot.exe. 
34 
C: \W INDOWSteystem 3 2 (command. co 
=131*1 
;:\EshaSMaster's ProjectNGS29?SPackihg_Cryptinff>pepack 
PE-PftCK ul.0 ,',, ., 
Registered to" PUBLIC! 
.flKfWiM. 
Usa .s 'E ; •f i l e n a m e ' . 1/— iojjii&rts.-]-. 
O p t i o r jM-fMvrvMM-jsra" 
B u t . ~$m 
is ".; - • -." - . ' . ' 
" » " . • - - ? • . - fa ' I ; •"•••-••• 
..--- .-— o 
' -i»s— - ''-
.... —wej*. 
'." ' - i c n - '" " 
'•— a l r i • • " " ' -
.—sjpd ;. •'•' .. -
•'•'• •.•- a . o p t i o n .•can ' s t a r t w i t h • '/s• ,-
';•:•. ;-- t h i s "siror't" help.'••"•' . ; . ' "'.••'.•'; 
'.•:"..: "• w i ' l t e " . t o - . o u t p u t . e x e . - -. 
-• '• .•• do- n o t . pack --RES.QJJKCES . > 
a l s o - .pack, v e r s i o n i n f o • •• 
• "• a l s o p a c k IGOB' - *..• • 
. s e t f i l e , . a l i g n : t o 512 ••'.-.:' - ; 
" . : • ' • ' f a s t e i " . compres s io'n. '. .:-'•• 
'-•.•OX 
'-. -' ,., 
: \ E s } i a ^ M a s t e r ' s P r o j e c t S G S 2 9 9 \ P a c k i r i g ^ C r y p t i n g > p e p a e k r B o t . e x e - o 
:Pi-PftCM:>1.fl•• "'•• - . jtC¥fCs 
R e g i s t e r e d ' to ' : PUBLIC! 
Jl-":fa5..flMfifiM 
- 5 s i i 5 2 „ : . • • " . ,. ; . . .- ••-.: - '•,:-•••:<. :•-,• ' . : • .: 
32" J i l t -.-Windows.- P o r t a b l e -. E x e c u t a b l e . -.<P.E> 
Jye "•£ap'.'^ow.'.';. s> \ '-. ',-.--":'--''''.'•' ", --'/./-- "-'-.-." 
:\EshaSMaster's Project\CS299\Packing^Crypting>^ 
Figure 6.1: Packing of rBotexe 
The command "pepack rBot.exe -o" instructs the "pepack" executable to pack the file 
named "rBot.exe". The switch -o indicates that the output of the packer will be written 
to a file named "OUTPUT.EXE". Code, data and resource sections of the rBot 
executable file are compressed by pepack, and the compressed output is written to 
OUTPUT.EXE. 
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Figure 6.2 shows a new file named OUTPUT.EXE being created in the folder where the 
pepack command was executed. 
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Figure 6.2: OUTPUT.EXE 
6.2.2 Crypting rBotexe 
An encrypting tool called "Poisen Ivy Crypter" is very popular among the black hat 
community. This tool was obtained from underground forums and was used to encrypt 
the packed rBot.exe ("Poisen Ivy Crypter," 2009). 
Figure 6.3 shows the encryption process performed using Poisen Ivy Crypter on 
OUTPUT.EXE obtained in the packing process explained in section 6.2.1. 
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Figure 6.3: Crypting of OUTPUT.EXE 
As shown in Figure 6.3, OUTPUT.EXE is selected as the input file to Poisen Ivy Crypter 
and the button labeled "Build" is clicked. Figure 6.4 shows the next step in the 
encryption process after the "Build" button is clicked. 
Poisen Ivy Crypter prompts a dialog box to save the encrypted target file. This file can 
be saved with any desired filename and .exe as the file extension. Figure 6.4 shows the 
"Save As" dialog box. 
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Figure 6.4: "Save As" dialog box prompted by Poisen Ivy Crypter 
A new executable file is created with the filename provided in the "Save As" dialog box. 
Figure 6.5 shows the newly created executable file which is an encrypted form of the 
rBot.exe. 
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Figure 6.5: Encrypted form of rBot.exe 
The original bot client file rBot.exe is of size 548 KB. The packed hot client file 
OUTPUT.EXE is of size 210 KB which is less than half the size of the original bot client 
file. The encrypted bot client file rBotPackedNCrypted.exe is of size 660 KB. The 
encryption process increases the file size. However, since the file was already packed, 
the file size after encryption is much smaller than what it would have been without the 
intermediate packing process. Figure 6.6 shows a distinction between the different 
executable files for the RxBot. 
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Figure 6.6: Distinction between rBot executable files 
6.2.3 Anti-virus scanning results 
The bot client executable files were scanned through multiple anti-virus scanners to 
observe the effect of packing and crypting on the bot detection. An online malware 
scanning website was used for obtaining the scanning results ("Online malware scan," 
2009). Figure 6.7 shows the comparison of scanner results on the bot client before and 
after packing and crypting. 
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Figure 6.7: Comparison of anti-virus scanning results 
The difference in virus detection after encrypting the executable can be clearly observed 
through the results in Figure 6.7. The "AntiVir" scanner is not able to detect the 
malicious executable at all after the Crypting process. Other scanners fail to detect the 
specific Rbot as it was detected by the same scanners before the Crypting process. 
Another scanning experiment was performed using McAfee's On-Access scan on the 
original bot client and the encrypted bot client executable files. The original rBot.exe 
was detected and deleted by McAfee's On-Access scan as shown in Figure 6.8. 
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K.On-Access Scan Messages 
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Figure 6.8: Original rBotexe detected by McAfee 
McAfee's On-Access scan failed to detect the encrypted RxBot executable file as shown 
in Figure 6.9. 
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Fife Edit ".&/> Favgrties K # 
$ •^Search ';'-''_ Folders I J T M " 
.Address | £ ) C:\Documents and Settings^espatil-l\Desktop^exes for virus scan 
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[ f t Copy this file 
^ Publish this file to the Web 
Q E-mail this file 
)% Delete this File 
{ § Desktop 
|jj?J My Documents 
Q Shared Documents 
Q My Computer 
* Q My Network Places 
rBotPackedNCrvpted 
M.Tj. iJMi&iM^<miJi iJ j , i t i iy^ 
:. Scan Detection Help 
Scarring ire 
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Picgiess 
jJNothing found 
Jfilsl 
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Figure 6.9: McAfee scan results for packed and crypted rBot executable 
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Thus, a bot herder can take an old bot executable that was previously detected and make 
it undetectable simply by passing it through the packing and crypting processes. 
43 
Chapter 7: Future Work 
In this section, the use of honeypots for the detection of Rxbot is proposed as future 
work. 
7.1 Introduction to Honeypots 
The primary goal of a honeypot is to gather information about different attacks that take 
place in the wild. Honeypots can store mischievous activities of an attacker who interacts 
with them. This information can then aid the study of various tools and techniques 
employed by the attackers to perform destructive attacks ("Honeypots," 2009). 
7.1.1 Where did the name come from? 
A pot of honey kept at the entrance of a trap can attract a bear into a trap. Once the bear 
is inside, the lid of the trap can be closed or rather kept open for the bear to explore, and 
his actions can be recorded for study (Spitzner, 2002). In the Internet world, the bear 
resembles the black hat community. A honeypot is a trap set to attract attackers to 
interact with it, and the actions of the attacker are recorded ("Honeypots," 2009). 
7.1.2 Definition 
Spitzner (2002) defines honeypots as "an information system resource whose value lies in 
unauthorized or illicit use of that resource." 
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7.2 Types of Honeypots 
Honeypots can be categorized into the following two types based on their complexity and 
the amount of interaction that is allowed ("Honeypots," 2009): 
• Low-interaction Honeypots 
• High-interaction Honeypots 
Low-interaction honeypots are simple to deploy and maintain. Also, they pose less of a 
risk because they do not work with real production systems. However, due to the 
emulation of operating systems and other services, they do not give much control to the 
attacker (Spitzner, 2002). 
High-interaction honeypots expose real operating systems and applications to the 
attackers for interaction. They work with real systems rather than emulated systems. 
This allows an analyst to capture a wide range of information that can aid in learning 
about new tools and techniques used for attacks. The disadvantage of high-interaction 
honeypots is the complexity and difficulty involved in deployment. The level of risk is 
high, since the attacker can possibly gain control of the honeypot. For example, an 
attacker might take over the honeypot and use it to attack non-honeypot systems 
(Spitzner, 2002). 
45 
7.3 The value of Honeypots 
The advantages of honeypots can be summarized in brief (Spitzner, 2002): 
• Since honeypots have simple designs, minimal resources are required. 
• Expensive, high end computers are not mandatory for deployment of honeypots. 
• Smaller sets of data with very high values are collected by honeypots. 
• All activities that come in contact with honeypots are recorded. 
• Only attackers are allowed to interact with honeypots. 
• New technologies and tools used by attackers can be detected with the help of 
honeypots. 
• The probability of mis-configuration is low. 
7.4 Limitations of Honeypots 
Honeypots have certain disadvantages (Spitzner, 2002): 
• Honeypot can only track activity that interacts with it 
• Attackers may be able to take over the honeypot and use it for harmful purposes 
• Attacks against other systems cannot be captured unless they interact with the 
honeypot setup 
7.5 Proposed future work 
The next step in the analysis process of Rxbot will be using a honeypot for gathering data 
concerning on-going, real-world, bot activity and analyzing the collected data (Provos, 
2007). A trap can be set in the form of a honeypot and a large volume of data can be 
46 
collected for Rxbot activity that is occuring on the Internet. Once a real botnet is 
detected, a fake client can become part of the botnet, and the attacker's tools, techniques, 
and strategies can be studied in detail. Various open source honeypot daemons are 
available. Nepenthes ("Nepenthes," 2008) or Honeyd ("Honeyd," 2008) appear to be 
ideal for this type of experimental work. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
The analysis performed on Rxbot using static and dynamic analysis techniques aids 
understanding of the botnet formation, propagation, and exploitation capabilities. The 
use of IRC for Command and Control enables the bot herders to remotely control their 
botnets. Password-protected IRC channels allow the bots to communicate in private and 
protected channels. The bot herders employ various tricks to keep their bots hidden from 
view. The bots have the capability to spread their infection to other PCs and compromise 
a huge number of PCs on the Internet. 
The study of packing and crypting reveals the capability of these processes to trick anti-
virus scanners and other security software. It is evident from this study how bot herders 
prevent their botnets from being detected. Packing contributes to the spreading speed of 
a bot by making the bot client file smaller, whereas crypting helps the bot to bypass 
security software. 
Malware exploits are increasing at an alarming rate. The Internet is continuously 
endangered by black hats. It is thus essential to encourage the study of malware in order 
to develop highly effective measures to curb black hat operations. 
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